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Competition and Cooperation in Liner Shipping 
William Sjostrom1 
 
1. Introduction 
Liner shipping is the business of offering common carrier ocean shipping 
services in international trade. Since it became an important industry in the 1870s, it 
has been characterized by various agreements between firms. Historically, since the 
formation in 1875 of the Calcutta Conference, the conference system was the primary 
form of agreement in liner shipping. Variously called liner conferences, shipping 
conferences, and ocean shipping conferences, they are formal agreements between 
liner shipping lines on a route, always setting (possibly discriminatory) prices, and 
sometimes pooling profits or revenues, managing capacity, allocating routes, and 
offering loyalty discounts. Conferences agreements were quite successful and in many 
cases have lasted for years. In the last two decades, conferences have begun to be 
supplanted by alliances (particularly in the American and European trades, where 
legislative changes have been unfavourable to them), which are less complete (they 
do not, for example, set prices) but encompass more broadly defined trade routes. 
Section 1 will review cooperative agreements in the liner industry, including 
conferences and alliances (1.1), as well as the historical origins of that cooperation 
(1.2).  Section 2 reviews the primary models that have been used to explain the 
conference system, including models of monopolizing cartels (2.1), contestability 
(2.2), destructive competition (2.3), and the empty core (2.4).  Section 3 reviews a 
variety of practices and alleged practices in liner shipping, including predatory pricing 
(3.1), loyalty contracts (3.2), price discrimination (3.3), and price and output fixing 
(3.4).  Finally, section 4 offers a brief conclusion. 
1.2 Cooperation 
International liner shipping has long been dominated by collusive agreements, 
originally conferences and more recently alliances.  Conferences have been used since 
at least the 1870s, when the industry was being established.  In recent years, these 
agreements have been supplemented and replaced by other kinds of agreements such 
as consortia and alliances.  The focus of this chapter is on explaining the economic 
models of competition used to analyse cooperation in liner shipping for purposes of 
competition policy. 
Conferences are organizations of shipping lines operating on a particular route.  
At different times, subject to various regulations, they have set tariffs, employing 
policing agencies to check on adherence to the tariff.  Members have been fined out 
of the membership bonds they post.2  They may also allocate output among their 
members, by either cargo quotas or more commonly sailing quotas.  If ships always 
sailed at the same capacity, which they do not, cargo and sailing quotas would be 
identical.  Sailing quotas are, however, probably easier to enforce.  They may also 
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer in Economics, Centre for Policy Studies, National University of Ireland, Cork 
 
2 Jansson, J.O. and Shneerson, D.  1987, Liner Shipping Economics (London: Chapman and Hall).  For 
historical evidence on this point, see also Greenhill, R. 1977,  Shipping, 1850-1914.  In: Business 
Imperialism, 1840-1930: An Inquiry Based on British Experience in Latin America, edited by D.C.M. 
Platt.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 119-155. 
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pool revenues and allocate particular ports on a given route.3  All of these practices 
have been used by conferences throughout their history.  For example, in the late 
nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth century, as part of the 
Calcutta Conference, the P&O, the B.I., and the Hansa line had an agreement about 
the number of sailings each would make out of Hamburg.4 
In the 1970s, liner consortia and alliances were formed by conference members 
as a supplementary means of conference enforcement.5  They are essentially a system 
of common agency.  More significant has been the rise of the strategic alliance. They 
were first used in the 1990s,6 and there is some evidence that conferences are being 
displaced by alliances, perhaps because of the declining antitrust immunity of 
conferences. Alliances engage in cross route rationalization, and there is some 
evidence that the rationalization reduces costs by taking advantage of economies of 
density.7 Unlike conferences, they do not issue a common tariff, but they cover much 
broader trade routes.  Only recently have economists begun to examine them.  
Unfortunately, the state of research is limited to a lot of speculation about their 
functions and effects, and a few facts, without substantial testing of models of 
alliances. 
Speculation on the reasons for alliances has focused on risk reduction and scale 
economies.  The claims about risk reduction focus on two issues.  First, alliances give 
liners companies access to other routes without investing in ships, thereby reducing 
the risk of new investment.8  Second, by reserving slots on ships from other members 
of the alliance working other routes, liner companies reduce risk by diversifying into 
multiple routes.9 
Although no evidence has been produced in support of the expansion explanation 
of risk, there is cross industry evidence that firms use strategic alliances for this 
reason.10  Explanations that focus on diversifying through multiple routes face the 
problem that investors can already diversify their portfolios by investing in multiple 
lines on different routes.  If there is evidence for this explanation, it will likely have to 
                                                 
3 Bennathan, E. and Walters, A.A.  1969,  The Economics of Ocean Freight Rates  (New York: 
Praeger); Jansson, J.O. and Shneerson, D.  1987, Liner Shipping Economics (London: Chapman and 
Hall). 
4 Smith, J.R.  1906,  Ocean freight rates and their control by line carriers.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 14, 525-541.  The range of detail in conference agreements is described in Deltas, G., 
Serfes, K., and Sicotte, R.  1999,  American shipping cartels in the pre-World War I era.  Research in 
Economic History, 16, 1-38. 
5 Farthing, B.  1993, International Shipping, Second Edition.  (London: Lloyd’s of London Press); 
Clarke, R.L.  1997,  An analysis of the international ocean shipping conferences system.  
Transportation Journal, 36, 17-29. 
6 OECD.  2001, Regulatory Issues in International Maritime Transport, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/63/2065436.pdf 
7 Bergantino, A.S. and Veenstra, A.W.  2000, Interconnection and Co-ordination: An Application of 
Network Theory to Liner Shipping International Journal of Maritime Economics, 4, 231-248. 
8 Ryoo, D-K. and Thanopoulou, H.A.  1999,  Liner alliances in the globalization era: a strategic tool 
for Asian container carriers.  Maritime Policy and Management,  26, 349-367; Midoro, R. and Pitto, A.  
2000,  A critical evaluation of strategic alliances in liner shipping.  Maritime Policy and Management,  
27, 31-40. 
9 Sheppard, E. and Seidman, D.  2001,  Ocean shipping alliances: the wave of the future? International 
Journal of Maritime Economics, 3, 351 – 367. 
10 Robinson, D.T.  2008.  Strategic alliances and the boundaries of the firm.  Review of Financial 
Studies, 21, 649-681. 
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come from focusing on managerial risk.  There is cross industry evidence that 
managers with specialised skills diversify to protect themselves against bankruptcy 
and job loss11 
The claims about scale economies12 focus on economies in marketing and 
allocating ships to ports to reduce shipping time.  The evidence available supports 
these explanations, with evidence that alliances reduce costs13 and raise capacity 
utilisation14.  How well these explanations work will, however, have to address the 
evidence that alliances are in decline over the last decade.15 
1.1 Historical Origins 
Because sailing ships are subject to the vagaries of the wind, liner shipping 
offering regular scheduled service had to wait for the arrival of the steam vessel,16 
although the thirteenth century Venetians operated what can be interpreted as a liner 
service to the eastern Mediterranean using a combination of oar and sail.17  Steam did 
not begin to be a competitor to the sailing ship until the development of the compound 
engine in the late 1860s and the triple expansion engine in the early 1880s.18  These 
developments substantially improved fuel economy and increased speed to about 10-
12 knots.  The compound engine cut fuel consumption by over half compared to a 
single cylinder steam engine.  Essentially, it involved adding additional cylinders to 
the steam engine, each additional cylinder reusing steam before it cooled.  The 
increase in fuel economy also expanded the space available for cargo.  Steam vessels 
began to offer regular, scheduled service, i.e., liner service.  It is in liner shipping that 
conferences have thrived. 
Curiously, sailing vessels belonged to conferences operating on the UK-Australia 
route and the Germany-South America route,19  and there were early British coastal 
conferences involving sailing vessels as well.20  By and large, however, these were 
exceptions. 
                                                 
11 May, D.  1995, Do managerial motives influence firm risk reduction strategies?  Journal of Finance, 
50, 1291 – 1308. 
12 Ryoo, D-K. and Thanopoulou, H.A.  1999,  Liner alliances in the globalization era: a strategic tool 
for Asian container carriers.  Maritime Policy and Management,  26, 349-367; Midoro, R. and Pitto, A.  
2000,  A critical evaluation of strategic alliances in liner shipping.  Maritime Policy and Management,  
27, 31-40; Sheppard, E. and Seidman, D.  2001,  Ocean shipping alliances: the wave of the future? 
International Journal of Maritime Economics, 3, 351 – 367. 
13 Bergantino, A. and Veenstra, A.  2002,  Interconnection and co-ordination: an application of 
network theory to liner shipping, International Journal of Maritime Economics, 4, 231 – 248. 
14 Fusillo, M.  2006,  Some notes on structure and stability in liner shipping, Maritime Policy and 
Management, 33, 463 – 475. 
15 Parola, F. and Musso, E.  2007,  Market structures and competitive strategies: the carrier – stevedore 
arm – wrestling in northern European ports, Maritime Policy and Management, 34, 259 – 278. 
16 Boyce, G.H. 1995,  Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale 
Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919  (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
17 Fleming, D.K.  2002,  Reflections on the History of US Cargo Liner Service (Part I),  International 
Journal of Maritime Economics, 4, 369-389. 
18 Harley, C.K. 1971, The shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850-1890: a study in technological 
change and its diffusion.  In: Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, edited by D.N. 
McCloskey  (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 215-234. 
19 Burley, K.  1968,  British Shipping and Australia, 1920-1939  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
20 Armstrong, J.  1991,  Conferences in British nineteenth-century coastal shipping.  Marriner’s 
Mirror,  77, 55-65. 
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The U.K.-Calcutta conference is usually described as the first conference, and it 
is certainly the first modern conference.  It started in 1875, consisting of five carriers: 
the P&O (Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co.), the B.I. (British India), and 
the City, Clan, and Anchor Lines.  Within a decade or so, the conference extended its 
coverage of ports of origin from only the UK to the rest of northern Europe. 
It was followed quickly by the development of other conferences.  In the thirty 
years following the formation of the U.K.-Calcutta conference, conferences were 
formed on most of the major trade routes out of the UK and northern Europe.  The 
Australia conference was started in 1884, the South African conference in 1886, the 
West African and northern Brazil conferences in 1895, the River Plate conference in 
1896, the west coast of South America conference in 1904, and a conference covering 
the North Atlantic trade around 1900.21  Most of these conferences covered the 
outbound trade from Europe, leaving the inbound trades of mostly bulk commodities 
to tramp vessels.22 
There were precursors, however.  A conference from 1850 to 1856 on the North 
Atlantic involved the British and North American Steam Packet Company (the 
Cunard Line) and the New York and Liverpool United States Mail Steamship 
Company (the Collins Line).23  Glasgow ship owners may have fixed rates with a 
conference system in the 1860s.24  In addition, the Transatlantic Shipping Conference 
was formed in 1868.  It was concerned, however, with issues such as uniform bills of 
lading and improving methods for inspecting cargo, and did not become involved in 
rate setting until 1902.25  Although conferences are generally associated with 
international shipping, there were precursors in British coastal shipping as early as the 
1830s.26 
Conferences were limited to the liner trades, without any success in the bulk 
trades.27  There were also conferences in the passenger shipping trade.28 
It is commonly assumed by historians of shipping conferences that they were 
formed in response to excess capacity, typically based on documents produced by 
                                                 
21 Kirkaldy, A.  1914,  British Shipping  (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner); Dyos, H.J. and 
Aldcroft, D.H.  1969,  British Transport: An Economic Survey from the Seventeenth Century to 
Twentieth (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 
22 Marx, D.  1953, International Shipping Cartels (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Dyos, H.J. 
and Aldcroft, D.H.  1969,  British Transport: An Economic Survey from the Seventeenth Century to 
Twentieth (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 
23 Sloan, E.W.  1998,  The first (and very secret) international steamship cartel, 1850-1856.  Research 
in Maritime History,  14, 29-52. 
24 Dyos, H.J. and Aldcroft, D.H.  1969,  British Transport: An Economic Survey from the Seventeenth 
Century to Twentieth (Leicester: Leicester University Press) 
25 Smith, J.R.  1906,  Ocean freight rates and their control through combinations.  Political Science 
Quarterly, 21, 237-263. 
26 Armstrong, J.  1991,  Conferences in British nineteenth-century coastal shipping.  Marriner’s 
Mirror,  77, 55-65. 
27 McGee, J.S. 1960, Ocean freight conferences and American merchant marine. University of Chicago 
Law Review, 27, 191-314; Abrahamsson, B.J. 1980, International Ocean Shipping: Current Concepts 
and Principles (Boulder, Colorado: Westview) 
28 Deltas, G., Sicotte, R., and Tomczak, P.  2008,  Passenger shipping cartels and their effect on trans-
Atlantic migration, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 119-133. 
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participants in the trade.29  A common version of this argument is that the opening of 
the Suez Canal, by shortening the distance between Europe and Asia, created excess 
capacity, but this version is not supported by the evidence.30  Sailing vessels could 
not use the Canal.  Existing steamships had been built for short routes through t
Mediterranean Sea or the Red Sea, and most of them were scrapped after the opening 
of the Canal.  Moreover, after the opening of the Canal, there were increases in net 
steamship production, which increased later in the 1870s with the introduction of the 
double expansion engine.  The continued steamship production is inconsistent with 
excess capacity. 
he 
                                                
One alternative to cooperation would be merger.  Merger is generally a substitute 
for collusion, but not a perfect substitute because merger increases agency costs.31  
The only known attempt to explicitly replace a conference with a merger was the 
largely unsuccessful International Mercantile Marine Company.32 
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 changed the treatment of conferences 
under American antitrust law, effectively eliminating the ability of conferences to 
control their members by mandating secret and independent action.  EC regulation 
4056/86, which gave conferences an exemption from EC competition law, was 
repealed effective October 2008.  Given that agreements and mergers are substitutes, 
we should expect an increase in industry concentration.  Sys33 shows that mergers 
have increased worldwide industry concentration, using a wide variety of measures, 
including the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl index.  
2. Alternative Models of Agreements 
Most work on shipping conferences has involved four kinds of models: 
monopolistic cartels, contestable markets, destructive competitive, and empty cores.34  
The argument that conferences are monopolistic cartels is at least as old as Alfred 
Marshall,35 who argued that conferences could act as monopolists because there were 
substantial scale economies in the industry that led to a small number of firms.  Lenin 
and the Marxist historian J.A. Hobson described shipping conferences as vivid 
examples of the tendency toward the concentration of capital.36  The other 
 
29 Greenhill, R.  1998,  Competition or co-operation in the global shipping industry: the origins and 
impact of the conference system for British ship owners before 1914.  Research in Maritime History, 
14, 53-80. 
30 Sjostrom, W.  1989,  On the origin of shipping conferences: excess capacity and the opening of the 
Suez Canal.  International Journal of Transport Economics,  16, 329-335. 
31 Bittlingmay, G.  1985,  Did antitrust policy cause the great merger wave?  Journal of Law and 
Economics, 28, 77-118. 
32 Livermore, S. 1935, The success of industrial mergers.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 50, 68-96; 
Navin, T. and Sears. M.  1954,  A study in merger: formation of the International Mercantile Marine 
Company.  Business History Review, 28, 291-328; Boyce, G.H. 1995,  Information, Mediation and 
Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
33 Sys, C.  2009,  Is the container liner shipping industry an oligopoly?  Transport Policy 
(forthcoming). 
34 An innovative attempt was made to apply monopolistic competition models to conferences, but was 
not followed up.  See Officer, L. 1971, Monopoly and monopolistic competition in the international 
transportation industry.  Western Economic Journal, 9, 134-156. 
35 Marshall, A.  1921,  Industry and Trade  (London: Macmillan) 
36 Cafruny, A.W.  1987,  Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping 
(Berkeley: University of California Press) 
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explanations arose largely as responses to the cartel model.  Destructive competition 
and its modern variant, the empty core, are alternative explanations of why 
conferences exist.  Contestable markets have been used to criticise the proposition 
that conferences can usefully be described as monopolistic cartels.  This matters for 
competition policy, because if conferences are not monopolizing cartels, then 
competition policy need not address them. 
Models of competition are important for making sense of the role agreements 
play in liner shipping, and seeing whether those insights can be generalized to other 
industries.  They are also important for competition policy.  Assuming that 
competition authorities are attempting to increase competition,37 it is important to 
establish whether a particular practice reduces competition rather than having an 
alternative purpose.  If it can be established that a practice does not reduce 
competition, it needs no further analysis for purposes of competition policy. 
The term “competition” is routinely used vaguely, with differing and sometimes 
inconsistent meanings.  Sometimes it used simply to mean the number of sellers (both 
as a measure of concentration and as a measure of how far to the right the supply 
curve lies).  Sometimes it is used to mean low measured profitability,38 which is taken 
to mean the absence of monopoly and monopoly profit.  Sometimes it is used to mean 
that buyers have good substitutes; sometimes it is used simply to mean that the seller 
faces a downward sloping, rather than perfectly inelastic demand curve. 
Rather than getting absorbed in a semantic debate, it is simpler and more useful 
to think about competition by the outcome: the mark-up of price over marginal cost. 
2.1 Non-cooperative game-theoretic models of collusion: cartel enforcement 
It is easy to get involved in pointless and unproductive discussions about what it 
“really” means to be a cartel.  It is simpler to simply define a cartel, following the 
conventional practice of economists, as an agreement that attempts to get its members 
to act jointly as a monopolist.  Agreements that serve other purposes, such as 
preventing destructive competition, reducing risk, or trade promotion, should simply 
be referred to as such. 
In perfect competition, output allocation is simple and automatic.  Each seller 
produces an output such that its marginal cost is equal to the market price.  In a cartel, 
prices are increased, but output must be reduced.  Therefore, each firm’s output must 
be centrally directed.  Each firm produces an output such that marginal cost is less 
than the price, giving each firm an incentive to raise output and upset the cartel 
arrangement.  The primary problem for any monopolising cartel is therefore 
enforcement.  Enforcement means that output increases must be punished,39 but first 
they must be detected.40 
                                                 
Footnote continued next page 
37 A point disputed with respect to both the US and Europe in McChesney, F.S. and Shughart, W.F.  
1995, The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: the Public-Choice Perspective (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press) and Sjostrom, W. 1998, Competition law in the European Union and the United 
States.  In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, volume 1, edited by P. Newman 
(London: Macmillan), pp. 370-377. 
38 Productivity Commission.  1999,  International liner cargo shipping: a review of Part X of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974.  Report No. 9 (Canberra, Australia: AusInfo) 
39 The basic models of punishment are Green, E.J. and Porter, R.H.  1984, Noncooperative collusion 
under imperfect price information.  Econometrica, 52, 87-100, and Rotemberg, J.J. and Saloner, G. 
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One argument disputing the cartel explanation should be dispensed with quickly.  
A seller with market power will raise price until its rivals’ products are good 
substitutes.  (It will raise price until marginal cost equals marginal revenue.  Positive 
marginal cost implies positive marginal revenue, and positive marginal revenue 
implies an elastic demand.)  The frequent assertion that conferences cannot be 
monopolies or monopolistic cartels because they face too many good substitutes41 
may be the opposite: they face good substitutes because they act monopolistically. 
A number of attempts have been made to test whether shipping conferences can 
be explained by cartel models.  Fox measured the effect of the number of firms in a 
conference and a conference’s market share on freight rates.42  She finds that freight 
rates fall when the conference market share falls.  She also finds that as the number of 
conference members rises, freight rates also fall, which is consistent with Stigler’s 
theory of oligopoly,43 specifically that increased numbers in a cartel increase the cost 
of coordination and therefore lower price. 
In a separate paper, Fox looked at the provision in the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 
that allows conference members to deviate from conference rates on ten days notice.44  
A cartel model would predict that allowing independent action, even though it is 
public rather than secret price cutting, should undercut conferences because it makes 
enforcing the conference tariff more difficult.  She fails, however, to find evidence 
that the Act made any difference at all to conferences. 
Paul Clyde and James Reitzes, in an ingenious study, distinguished between 
increased freight rates because of increased conference market share and because of 
increased market concentration.45  They find statistically significant but economically 
insignificant effects of increased market concentration on freight rates, but, contrary 
to the results in Fox, no effect of increased conference market shares on freight rates. 
It is worth emphasis that focusing on price can be misleading.  Conferences can 
raise price because they restrict output (making shippers worse off) or because they 
add value, thereby raising demand and raising output.  A better test would be to focus 
on the effect of conferences on output.  Some insight can be gained from a study of 
trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels in the first decade of the twentieth century.46  
The authors estimated that westward migration fell by 20% – 25% because of the 
passenger cartels operating that decade. 
                                                                                                                                            
1986, A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms.  American Economic Review, 76, 
390-407. 
40 Stigler, G.J.  1964, A Theory of oligopoly.  Journal of Political Economy, 72, 41-61. 
41 Sletmo, G. and Williams, E.  1981, Liner Conferences in the Container Age: US Policy at Sea  (New 
York: Macmillan) 
42 Fox, N.R.  1992, An empirical analysis of ocean liner shipping.  International Journal of 
Transportation Economics, 19, 205-225. 
43 Stigler, G.J.  1964, A Theory of oligopoly.  Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44-61. 
44 Fox, N.R.  1995, Some effects of the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 on ocean liner shipping 
conferences.  Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 26, 531-544. 
45 Clyde, P.S. and Reitzes, J.D.  1998, Market power and collusion in the ocean shipping industry: is a 
bigger cartel a better cartel?  Economic Inquiry, 36, 292-304. 
46 Deltas, G., Sicotte, R., and Tomczak, P.  2008,  Passenger shipping cartels and their effect on trans-
Atlantic migration, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 119-133. 
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Deltas, Serfes, and Sicotte took a historical approach, using a sample of 47 pre-
World War I conferences.47  They looked for reasons why a cartel might be easier to 
negotiate and enforce, arguing that a cartel can then successfully impose stricter, less 
flexible terms on its members.  Enforcement is easier if there is multi-market contact.  
The basic intuition is that punishment for deviations from a cartel agreement in one 
market can be carried out in several markets.  It also argues that enforcement is also 
easier if one or more of the firms has a large global market share.  In that case, it is 
easier for the large firm to transfer ships to a market to carry out punishment.  
Agreements are easier to negotiate if there are a small number of firms and if there is 
heterogeneity in size, allowing a large firm to dominate the agreement.  A strict, 
inflexible agreement is also more sustainable if entry is less likely. 
This argument should not be confused with the idea that a firm operating in 
multiple markets can cross-subsidize predatory pricing to prevent destabilizing entry.  
Gordon Boyce48 argues that because the International Mercantile Marine (a 
combination of five transatlantic lines sponsored by J.P. Morgan formed in the period 
1900-1902) ran diversified lines from the UK to Canada, the US, and Australasia, it 
could use cross-subsidization to harm smaller, single route firms.  Boyce’s argument 
requires highly inefficient capital markets, because both the predator and its victim 
are borrowing for a price war.  The predator is merely borrowing from its own income 
stream.49 
A different approach is to use developments in what has been called the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization.  The approach can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.  In 
models of monopoly and of perfect competition, an increase in demand raises price 
and output, and a decrease in demand lowers both, as shown in Figure 1.  Therefore, 
the consequences of a rise or fall in demand cannot separate the two models.  Suppose 
instead that the demand rotates (becoming steeper or flatter).  In a model of perfect 
competition, this does not raise or lower price or output.  In a model of monopoly, 
however, flattening the demand curve raises marginal revenue relative to demand, 
thereby lowering price and raising output.  Making demand steeper lowers marginal 
revenue relative to demand, thereby raising price and lowering output.  This can be 
seen in Figure 2. 
Price
Quantity
Price
Quantity
S
D1
D2
D1
MR1
D2
MR2
MC
Figure 1  
                                                 
47 Deltas, G., Serfes, K., and Sicotte, R.  1999,  American shipping cartels in the pre-World War I era.  
Research in Economic History, 16, 1-38. 
48 Boyce, G.H. 1995,  Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale 
Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919  (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
49 McGee, J.S.  1980, Predatory pricing revisited.  Journal of Law and Economics, 23, 289-330. 
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Start by writing the market demand curve as P(Q), so that price depends on 
quantity sold.  The slope of the demand curve is P/Q.  Marginal revenue is P + 
(P/Q)Q.  The second term is the difference between marginal revenue and price.  
Static oligopoly models predict how much of that difference is perceived by sellers.  
Let λ be the fraction of that difference that is perceived by sellers.  The marginal 
revenue as perceived by sellers is P + λ(P/Q)Q. 
Different oligopoly models imply different values of λ.  In monopoly, the whole 
marginal revenue is perceived, so λ = 1.  In perfect competition (or Bertrand Nash 
equilibrium), none of the marginal revenue is perceived (marginal revenue is simply 
market price), so λ = 0.  In Cournot Nash, the economist’s standard model of non-
cooperative equilibrium, λ is the Hirshman-Herfindahl index (the sum of the squared 
market shares).50 
The value of λ is found by equating perceived marginal revenue to marginal cost.  
As a simple example, suppose the demand curve is  
(1) P = β0 + β1Q + β2ZQ + β3Z, 
where P is price, Q is output, and Z is a demand shifter.  Note that the slope of the 
demand curve is β1 + β2Z, so that Z can also rotate the demand curve, as in figure 2 
above. 
Given the demand equation, marginal revenue can be written as P + (β1 + β2Z)Q, 
and therefore perceived marginal revenue can be written as P + λ(β1 + β2Z)Q.  Write 
industry marginal cost as 
MC = δ0 + δ1Q + δ2W, 
where W measures some input price.51  (If δ1 = 0, then marginal cost is constant.)  
Profit is maximised when perceived marginal revenue equals marginal cost, that is, 
when 
P + λ(β1 + β2Z)Q = δ0 + δ1Q + δ2W, or equivalently, when 
(2) P = δ0 + (δ1 – λβ1)Q – λβ2ZQ + δ2W  
                                                 
50 Perloff, J., Karp, L., and Golan, A.  2007, Estimating Market Power and Strategies  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 43 - 47 
51 The extremely parsimonious descriptions of demand and marginal cost are for illustration, not a 
guide to actual empirical work. 
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Equation 1, (the demand function) and equation 2 (the profit maximisation 
condition), can be estimated jointly, and λ can be estimated from the ratio of the 
coefficient of ZQ in equation 2 (– λβ2) to its coefficient in equation 1 (β2).52 
One important drawback to this approach is that the value of  is not clearly 
specified in a cartel model, and that poses a problem for measuring whether 
agreements in liner shipping are cartel arrangements.  A costlessly enforced cartel 
would have  = 1, that is, it would behave like a monopolist.  It would equate industry 
marginal revenue to industry marginal cost.  Note that equating marginal revenue to 
marginal cost is the same as setting marginal revenue minus marginal cost (i.e., 
marginal profit) equal to zero.  At the industry profit maximum, a small increase in 
output costs roughly zero in profits.  Cartel enforcement is not costless, however, 
because setting price above marginal cost gives cartel members an incentive to cheat.  
At the industry profit maximum, a small increase in output does not lower profits, but 
preventing it incurs positive enforcement costs.  It follows that the cartel equilibrium 
involves higher output and lower price than the monopoly equilibrium.53  The 
economic theory of cartels tells us  will be less than one and greater than its non-
cooperative equilibrium value, but little beyond that.  Where it lies in between those 
two values depends on the costs of cartel enforcement. 
These techniques allow both a measure of the extent of competition in the market 
and a way to test alternative theories of markets.  Even though cartel models do not 
make a specific prediction about the value of , the models are good for estimating 
how, for example, various legislative changes alter the value of .  Using these 
techniques, Wilson and Casavant54 offered evidence that the US Shipping Act of 
1984 raised the value of  (in other words, raised prices), except where the Act 
explicitly allowed conference members to independently deviate from conference
rates, in which case it lowered  (in other words, lowered prices).  Unfortunately, 
although this approach could tell us a lot about the effect of regulation in the industry
Wilson and Casavant are the only authors I am aware of who apply these techniques 
to liner shi
 
, 
pping. 
                                                
Now that these techniques are laid out in detail, there is scope for more formal 
testing of a variety of questions about competition, including the assumption that bulk 
shipping is best explained by models of perfect competition.55 
2.3 Non-cooperative game-theoretic models of collusion: contestable markets 
The theory of contestable markets focuses heavily on sunk costs.  It draws on the 
insight that potential competitors are a constraint on pricing behaviour as much as 
actual competitors.  Suppose in a market there are no sunk costs and incumbent firms 
do not respond to entry by lowering prices.  Then entry is costless in the sense that all 
costs of entry can be recovered on exit.  Entry is therefore riskless.  Moreover, the 
 
52 The econometric issues in measuring  are discussed in detail in Perloff, J., Karp, L., and Golan, A.  
2007, Estimating Market Power and Strategies  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chapter 2. 
53 Johnsen, D. Bruce.  1991, Property rights to cartel rents: The Socony-Vacuum story.  Journal of Law 
and Economics.  43, 177-203. 
54 Wilson, W. and Casavant, K.  1991, Some market power implications of the Shipping Act of 1984.  
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics.  16, 427-434. 
55 Pirrong, S.C.  1993,  Contracting practices in bulk shipping markets: a transactions cost explanation, 
Journal of Law and Economics,  36, 937-976. 
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entrant can make its entry decision without regard to strategic decisions by the 
incumbent. 
Suppose a market had only one seller.  The seller could not act as a monopolist 
because an entrant would undercut it.  If entry is costless, schemes to exclude entry do 
not work because the entrant cannot be threatened with losses on entry.  Should the 
entrant face the prospect of losses, it can always costlessly depart until the problem 
goes away. 
John Davies has emphasized focused attention on the degree to which liner firms 
face sunk costs, and the risks of retaliatory price-cutting.56  He has provided evidence 
that sunk costs are low, and that retaliation is slow.  That is, he has shown that the 
assumptions of contestability are roughly satisfied by the liner market.  If the liner 
market is contestable, then conferences may have difficulty acting like monopolizing 
cartels.  Whatever service they provide, they must do so at (economic) cost, lest they 
are uncut by entry.57 
An important, unresolved difficulty is how sensitive contestable markets to 
deviations from the assumptions of zero fixed costs and no retaliatory pricing.  There 
are theoretical grounds for believing that very small deviations from these 
assumptions can have large consequences for contestability,58 but little effort has 
been made to empirically quantify the problem. 
                                                
2.4 Destructive Competition 
Destructive competition arguments come in two forms.  The usual form among 
maritime economists focuses on high sunk costs, inelastic demand, and the risks to 
carriers of “overtonnaging” or excess capacity.  (The next section discusses another 
version, the theory of the core.)  Daniel Marx is the primary early exponent,59 and the 
argument has been made by industry practitioners.60  Maritime historians have tended 
to favour this argument as well.61  In this argument, because a large proportion of 
costs is sunk, it follows that price would have to fall substantially before sellers would 
leave the market.  Brooks argues: 
The high barriers to exit give shipowners reasons to delay capacity 
reduction; unless prices are good for scrap or the second-hand market 
is buoyant, there is a tendency to hope that a redeployment opportunity 
will materialize or be created.  This results in an industry with an 
almost perpetual state of capacity oversupply.62 
 
Footnote continued next page 
56 Davies, J.E. 1983, Pricing in the liner shipping industry: a survey of conceptual models.  Canadian 
Transport Commission, Report No. 1983/04E; Davies, J.E. 1989, Impediments to contestability in liner 
markets.  Logistics and Transportation Review, 25, 325-342. 
57 Further evidence is offered by Lam, J., Yap, W., and Cullinane, K.,  2007,  Structure, conduct, and 
performance on the major liner shipping routes [1].  Maritime Policy and Management, 34, 359 – 381. 
58 Farrell, J. 1986, How effective is potential competition?  Economics Letters,  20, 67-70; Gilbert R. 
1989,  The role of potential competition in industrial organization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
3, 107 – 127. 
59 Marx, D.  1953, International Shipping Cartels (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
60 Graham, M.G.  1998, Stability and competition in intermodal container shipping: finding a balance.  
Maritime Policy and Management, 25, 129-147. 
61 Hyde, F.E.  1967, Shipping Enterprise and Management 1830-1939 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press) 
62 Brooks, M.  2000,  Sea Change in Liner Shipping (Amsterdam: Pergamon), p. 62; see also Sagers, 
C.  2006,  The demise of regulation in ocean shipping: A study in the evolution of competition policy 
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The assertion of high exit barriers implies inelastic short run market supply.  It is 
frequently asserted that the demand for liner shipping services is highly inelastic.  A 
combination of inelastic supply and demand leads to a highly unstable price.  
Therefore, carriers are exposed to increased risk of losses, and shippers face 
substantial uncertainty about freight rates.  On this explanation, conferences offer 
reduced risk to both carriers and shippers. 
This explanation suffers from two serious flaws.63  First, if fluctuating prices lead 
to periods of losses, then they must also lead to periods of offsetting gains.  Carriers 
will not enter unless the risk-adjusted present value of profits is positive.  If long run 
changes in the market occur such that the present value of profits is negative, firms 
will (efficiently) leave the market, and the losses are their signal to do so.64  Second, 
if shippers valued rate stability, they could write forward contracts. 
2.5 Cooperative game-theoretic models of collusion: the empty core 
A more recent and theoretically coherent revival of the idea of destructive 
competition is the theory of the core,65 which has been applied several times to 
conferences66 and alliances.67 
The theory of the core focuses on avoidable fixed costs and the integer problem 
(the number of firms in an industry must be an integer). With avoidable fixed costs 
and rising marginal cost, the relevant average cost curve is U-shaped.  No output will 
be produced at any price below minimum average cost.  When price rises to a firm’s 
minimum average cost (p*), that firm will enter at the output q* where average cost is 
minimized.  The firm will produce q  q* if p  p*.  Under perfect competition, the 
firm’s output will therefore be either 0 or q  q*.  Suppose firms are identical.  Then 
at p*, industry output must be an integer multiple of q* (the integer problem).  It 
would be only by chance that demand at p* would be an integer multiple of q*.  It is 
therefore possible that demand and supply would not intersect.  The problem would 
go away if a firm were willing to produce a fraction of q*, but avoidable fixed costs 
mean that no firm could profitably do so. 
                                                                                                                                            
and the predictive power of microeconomics.  Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 39, 779-818, 
at p. 803, n. 110. 
63 McGee, J.S. 1960, Ocean freight conferences and American merchant marine.  University of 
Chicago Law Review, 27, 191-314; Bennathan, E. and Walters, A.A. 1969, The Economics of Ocean 
Freight Rates (New York: Praeger); Officer, L. 1971, Monopoly and monopolistic competition in the 
international transportation industry.  Western Economic Journal, 9, 134-156. 
64 Fusillo finds evidence of low supply elasticities, but finds evidence that conferences reduced supply 
elasticities.  See Fusillo, M.  2004, Is liner shipping supply fixed?  Maritime Economics & Logistics, 6, 
220 – 235. 
65 Surveyed in Telser, L. 1994, The usefulness of core theory in economics.  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8, 151-164. 
66 Sjostrom, W. 1989, Collusion in ocean shipping: a test of monopoly and empty core models. Journal 
of Political Economy, 97, 1160-1179; Pirrong, S.C. 1992, An application of core theory to the analysis 
of ocean shipping markets.  Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 89-131; Sjostrom, W. 1993, Antitrust 
immunity for shipping conferences: an empty core approach.  Antitrust Bulletin, 38, 419-423; Davies, 
J., Pirrong, C., Sjostrom, W. and Yarrow, G. 1995, Stability and related problems in liner shipping: an 
economic overview.  Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  US 
Senate, 104th Congress, first session. 
67 Button, K. 1999., Shipping alliances: Are they at the ‘core’ of solving instability problems in 
shipping?  Liner Shipping: What’s Next, Proceedings of the 1999 Halifax Conference, International 
Association of Maritime Economists, Halifax, Canada, September, pp. 58-88. 
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If inventories were inexpensive, a firm could produce only part of the time and 
provide a fraction of q* with inventories.  In transportation industries especially, 
however, output is cargo or passenger space.  Once the ship or airplane leaves, empty 
space is gone, so inventories are impossible.68  The only way to create inventories is 
to have excess capacity, which can lead to an empty core. 
The integer problem does not necessarily lead to an empty core, but is likely to 
under some circumstances.  Consider an example attributable to George 
Bittlingmayer.69  Suppose taxis can carry at most two passengers, and that the cost of 
a taxi trip is independent of whether there are zero, one, or two passengers.  
Admittedly, these assumptions are likely to be factually inaccurate.  Most taxis can 
squeeze in an extra passenger in a pinch, and extra passengers reduce mileage.  These 
assumptions, however, capture the same points that a more realistic but also more 
complex model would.  First, there are some scale economies: once a taxi carries one 
passenger, the marginal cost of a second is less than the average cost.  Second, there 
are capacity constraints: marginal cost exceeds average cost beyond some output. 
Assume each taxi’s cost of a trip to the airport is £5, and that there are no sunk 
costs, so the competitive supply of taxi trips is constant at £5 per trip.  Assume as 
well, for simplicity, that each possible passenger is willing to pay £10 for a taxi trip, 
so a taxi trip is efficient (relative to no trip) even if there is only one passenger.  
Suppose four people want to make a trip to the airport.  They will take two cabs, each 
with two passengers, and each pair of passengers will pay £5.  How they divide the £5 
cost between them is irrelevant to the problem. 
Suppose instead that only three people, imaginatively named A, B, and C, want 
to make the trip.  The efficient solution is for the three to take two taxis, generating a 
surplus of 3x£10 - 2x£5 = £20.  In this case, however, the problem of dividing the £10 
cost of the two taxis eliminates the possibility of a competitive equilibrium.  One 
possibility is that A and B travel together, pay £2.50 each, and let C travel alone and 
pay £5.  C, however, could offer to let A travel with him if A pays £1.  C is better off, 
paying only £4 instead of £5, and A is better off, paying only £1 instead of £2.50.  B 
is left, however, paying £5 instead of £2.50, leaving B in the same position as C was 
originally to upset the allocation. 
An equilibrium allocation has to ensure that no coalition (A, B, or C alone, pairs 
of A and B, A and C, or B and C, or the grand coalition of A, B, and C) can do better 
by upsetting the existing allocation.  If Xi is the surplus to customer i, i=A,B,C, then 
an equilibrium allocation has to satisfy the following constraints: 
XA + XB  £15; XA + XC  £15; XB + XC  £15 
Xi = XA + XB + XC  £20 
The first constraint states that any two passengers travelling together can get a 
combined surplus of £15.  The second constraint states that the best all three 
passengers can get is the surplus from the efficient solution of travelling in two taxis.  
Summing all three terms in the first constraint implies that Xi  £22.50, which is 
                                                 
68 The accounts in Smith, T.K. 1995, Why air travel doesn’t work. Fortune, 3 April, of conversations 
with airline executives are similar to the views routinely expressed by people in the liner shipping 
business, particularly the problem that inventories are extremely expensive. 
69 Bittlingmayer, G. 1989, The economic problem of fixed costs and what legal research can 
contribute.  Law and Social Inquiry, 14, 739-762. 
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inconsistent with the second constraint.  There is no equilibrium allocation.  In this 
example, q*=2, and if demand is not a multiple of two, there is no equilibrium. 
The absence of equilibrium in market exchange poses a problem for the 
participants in the market, both buyers and sellers, because it necessarily raises the 
costs of contracting.  Sellers will try to protect themselves from the consequences of 
the integer problem by selecting technology with lower capacity and higher costs.70  
It is therefore in the mutual interests of buyers and sellers to find a way to achieve an
allocation through non-market means.  It remains true that an individual buyer or 
seller has an incentive to disrupt the allocation, just as in a cartel model.  Unlike a 
cartel model, however, buyers as a group do not have an incentive to assist the 
deviating party. 
 
                                                
The example suggests two of the more interesting implications of the model of 
the empty core.  First, it is worth noting that there are ways of resolving the problem.  
For example, if the three passengers were friends, they might simply split the cost 
three ways because an attempt by two of them to exclude the third would result in the 
loss of a valuable friendship.  Alternatively, there might be a social custom, the 
violation of which would result in being ostracized, dictating that in such cases there 
be some fair division of the cost.  It is important, however, to recognize that these 
methods of resolving the problem are not market solutions.  This implies that 
collusion may be a means of resolving the problem of an empty core, although merger 
and vertical integration may be alternatives.  Archibald, et al.71 provide laboratory 
evidence that with high avoidable costs, players formed cartels, and that those cartels 
produced more efficient results than competition. 
Second, suppose there were sunk entry costs.  Then the necessity of earning a 
return on the initial sunk investment, aggravated by the prospect of facing the costs of 
an empty core, would limit entry.  In the example, suppose there are only three taxis.  
Then there is an empty core if demand is three or five, but not otherwise.  If demand 
were seven or greater, because capacity is only six, competition would drive the price 
up to the reservation price of £10, and only six passengers would travel.  The empty 
core would only occur when demand was low, for example if the industry were in 
decline or if demand were a low draw from a high variance distribution. 
Two systematic tests of the empty core model have been made.  Sjostrom72 
focused primarily on demand conditions.  Two important results are that increased 
conference market share raises output and that conferences are more dominant when 
demand is more variable, both consistent with an empty core and contrary to a 
monopoly model.  Sjostrom does not specify the precise mechanism whereby 
increased share increases output.  Given the results in the study by Clyde and 
Reitzes73 that increased market share has trivially positive effect on freight rates, the 
 
70 On this point, see Telser, L. 1978, EconomicTheory and the Core (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press), especially chapter 3, and McWilliams, A. 1990, Rethinking horizontal market restrictions: in 
defense of cooperation in empty core markets.  Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 30, 3-14. 
71 Archibald, G., van Boening, M., and Wilcox, N.  2002,  Avoidable cost: can collusion succeed 
where competition fails?  Research in Experimental Economics, 9, 217 – 242. 
72 Sjostrom, W. 1989, Collusion in ocean shipping: a test of monopoly and empty core models.  
Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1160-1179. 
73 Clyde, P.S. and Reitzes, J.D.  1998, Market power and collusion in the ocean shipping industry: is a 
bigger cartel a better cartel?  Economic Inquiry, 36, 292-304. 
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increased output presumably comes from less costly contracting and more efficient 
production. 
Pirrong74 focuses on measuring the assumptions of the model, providing 
evidence of rising marginal cost and U-shaped average cost curves (implying fixed
costs).  With cost data from the routes to Europe from the North and South Atlantic 
ports of the US, he estimates alternative cost functions.  Of particular interest is his 
successful use of the semi-logarithmic cost function, with the form (simplifying from
Pirrong) lnC = 0 + 1Q, where C is total cost and Q is output.  With 1 > 0, the 
marginal cost function is rising (C/Q = 1C > 0) and the average cost function
shaped [(C/Q)/Q = (C/Q)(1Q-1), which is negative if Q < 1/1 and positive if Q < 
1/1].  Pirrong’s empirical results imply falling average cost over a substantial ran
of output, which in turn implies that the integer problem is significant.  He also 
discusses why the model implies the absence of conferences in tramp shipping,
is consistent with only two attempts, both unsuccessful, to form conferences in tram
shipping.
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Empty core models have been successfully applied to other industries as well, 
from airlines76, to cast iron pipe77, to the Australian tomato industry78.  It has also 
been successfully applied more generally to the problems of merger and trusts79, 
although there has been some empirical dissent80. 
3. Liner Shipping Practices 
Three liner practices have generated some controversy.  Predatory pricing and 
loyalty contracts are ways in which liners may have attempted to preclude entry.  The 
effect of price discrimination on cartel stability is more problematic.  In a cartel 
model, it is destabilizing because it attracts entry.  In an empty core model, it is a way 
of increasing output when there are falling average costs. 
3.1 Predatory Pricing 
 
74 Pirrong, S.C. 1992, An application of core theory to the analysis of ocean shipping markets.  Journal 
of Law and Economics, 35, 89-131. 
75 McGee, J.S. 1960, Ocean freight conferences and American merchant marine. University of Chicago 
Law Review, 27, 191-314; Abrahamsson, B.J. 1980, International Ocean Shipping: Current Concepts 
and Principles (Boulder, Colorado: Westview) 
76 Antoniou, A. 1998,  The status of the core in the airline industry: the case of the European market.  
Managerial and Decision Economics 19, 43-54; Button, K. 2003, Does the theory of the ‘core’ explain 
why airlines fail to cover their long-run costs of capital?  Journal of Air Transport Management,  9, 5 – 
14.  For an opposing view, see Domanico, F. 2007,  The European airline industry: law and economics 
of low cost carriers, 23, 199 – 221. 
77 Bittlingmayer, G.  1982,  Decreasing average cost and competition: a new look at the Addyston Pipe 
case.  Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 201-229; Bittlingmayer, G. 1983,  Price fixing and the 
Addyston Pipe case. Research in Law and Economics, 5, 57 – 128. 
78 Hone, P. 1997,  Market power and contestability in factor markets: the case of tomato pricing.  
Economic Analysis & Policy, 27, 59-73. 
79 Bittlingmayer, G. 1985,  Did antitrust policy cause the great merger wave?  Journal of Law and 
Economics, 28, 77-118; McWilliams, A. and Keith, K. 1994, The genesis of the trusts: rationalization 
in empty core markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 12, 245-267; Bittlingmayer, 
G. 1995,  Output and stock prices when antitrust is suspended: experience under the NIRA.  In The 
Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, edited by F.S. McChesney and 
W. Shughart II.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 287-318.  
80 Taylor, J.E. 2002, The output effects of government sponsored cartels during the New Deal.  Journal 
of Industrial Economics.  50, 1-10. 
 
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN LINER SHIPPING  MARCH 
2010PAGE 16 
The most common allegations of predatory pricing, especially in the early years 
of conferences, revolved around the use of “fighting ships”.  The conference would, 
in response to an entrant, allegedly lower the rates on one of its vessels to compete 
with the entrant until the entrant lost money and left the market.  John McGee casts 
doubt on the use of fighting ships,81 describing them as instances of normal 
competition, but Basil Yamey82 cites the opinion in the 1891 decision by the law 
lords in the House of Lords in the case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow &
Co. et al.
 
ghts on the Yang-tse. 
                                                
83 for an example of the use of fighting ships.84  It is not clear, however, 
from Yamey’s discussion whether predatory pricing was successful in this instance.  
When, in 1885, Mogul sent two ships to Hankow, an inland port on the Yang-tse 
River (another non-conference firm sent a ship as well), the China conference 
responded by sending ships to Hankow, inducing a fall in rates, which the Court in 
Mogul described as unprofitable.  On the other hand, the two Mogul ships and the 
third independent ship sailed sufficiently full that they did not have to carry ballast 
(effectively garbage carried to stabilize the ship when there is too little cargo), 
whereas some of the conference ships sailed empty.  Although Mogul was not 
admitted to the China conference, it was given some landing ri
Two more recent contributions have improved our understanding of the ways in 
which conferences may have used predatory pricing to control entry.  Fiona Scott 
Morton, studying pre-World War I conferences, finds evidence supporting the “long 
purse” theory of predation, whereby firms can profitably engage in predation if their 
financial resources are large relative to the prey.85  A long purse theory requires that 
capital markets are sufficiently costly that the prey cannot gain access to capital to 
survive the price war, whereas the predator can, most likely because the predator 
already owns larger liquid assets before the war starts.86 
In a later study with the sociologist Joel Podolny,87 Scott Morton extended her 
earlier results primarily by finding that entrants with high social status were less 
likely to be preyed upon.  The social status of an entrant is used as a measure of the 
extent to which an entrant could be relied upon to cooperate with the conference.  
They also show that the effect of social status declined with the age of the entering 
firm.  This is consistent with the idea that information about a firm becomes more 
public over time and therefore the conference had less need to rely on social status as 
a proxy. 
 
81 McGee, J.S. 1960, Ocean freight conferences and American merchant marine. University of Chicago 
Law Review, 27, 191-314 
82 Yamey, B.S. 1972, Predatory price cutting: notes and comments.  Journal of Law and Economics, 
15, 129-142. 
83 [1892] App. Cas. 25 
84 Mogul Steamship Co. is the most well known instance of a claim of predatory pricing in liner 
shipping.  Useful discussions can be found in Letwin, W. 1965, Law and Economic Policy in America: 
The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) and Yamey, B.S. 
1972, Predatory price cutting: notes and comments.  Journal of Law and Economics, 15, 129-142.  Its 
legal fame rests on the Court’s decision that under common law, agreements in restraint of trade 
(which the Court judged the conference to be) are unenforceable but not actionable. 
85 Scott Morton, F. 1979, Entry and predation: British shipping cartels, 1879-1929. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 679-724. 
86 McGee, J.S. 1960, Ocean freight conferences and American merchant marine. University of Chicago 
Law Review, 27, 191-314; Bork, R.H. 1980, The Antitrust Paradox (New York: Basic Books). 
87 Podolny, J.M. and Scott Morton, F.M. 1999, Social status, entry, and predation: the case of British 
shipping cartels 1879-1929.  Journal of Industrial Economics, 47, 41-67. 
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These results are consistent with Gordon Boyce’s discussion88 of the 
International Mercantile Marine (IMM), a combination of five transatlantic lines 
sponsored by J.P. Morgan and formed in the period 1900-1902.  The IMM had 
alliances with two German lines, Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) and the Hamburg 
Amerika Line (HAPAG), with whom it had a ten year route allocation agreement.  
Boyce argued that IMM’s connection to Morgan gave it access to “abundant capital”. 
3.2 Loyalty Contracts 
Conferences used two kinds of loyalty contracts: the deferred rebate and the dual 
rate contract (sometimes called contract rates).  Under a dual rate system, the shipper 
signs an agreement to deal exclusively with the conference, and in turn receives a 
discount on the freight rate.  If the shipper uses a non-conference carrier, the 
conference imposes a fine.  Under a deferred rebate system, if the shipper deals 
exclusively with the conference for, say, six months (the typically length of time), and 
then deals exclusively with the conference for next six months, the shipper receives a 
rebate of an agreed proportion of his freight bill from the first six months.  The 
deferred rebate was a novel contract first introduced successfully by the UK-Calcutta 
Conference in 187789 after being proposed in 1873 on the Yang-tse River trade.90  
The deferred rebate system was prohibited in U.S. trades by the 1916 Shipping Act. 
                                                
There are two important distinctions between the two systems.  First, under the 
deferred rebate system, the shipper loses interest on the price cut.  Second, the 
conference incurs lower enforcement costs with the deferred rebate because it does 
not have to enforce the fine by going to court.91  Perhaps because of these differences, 
discounts under deferred rebates tended to be larger than under dual rate contracts, 
typically double the size.92  Under both systems, the conference must incur the costs 
of determining whether the contract has been broken, giving rise to estimates of 
violations of the loyalty agreements of 5-15% of shippers.93  In a recent study, 
however, Pedro Marín and Richard Sicotte used the event study technique to show 
that loyalty agreements made significant contributions to profitability.94 
Whichever system a conference used, deferred rebate and dual rate systems 
usually applied to only certain commodities.  For example, the Far East Conference 
introduced the deferred rebate when it was formed in 1879, but certain bulk 
commodities such as rice and silk were excluded from the loyalty arrangement.95  
 
88 Boyce, G.H. 1995,  Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale 
Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919  (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
89 Marshall, A. 1921, Industry and Trade (London: Macmillan); Marx, D. 1953, International Shipping 
Cartels (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
90 Marriner, S. and Hyde, F.E. 1967, The Senior: John Samuel Swire, 1825-1898, Management in the 
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Moreover, the loyalty requirement was typically waived if the conference were unable 
to provide sufficient capacity within a reasonable time.96 
Loyalty contracts are designed to encourage customers to use a particular seller 
exclusively.  The shipper is charged a lower price in exchange for dealing exclusively 
with the conference.  One question is whether they serve to exclude new entry, or 
whether they serve to reduce costs by gaining economies of regularity, such as easier 
planning.  A second question is, assuming they serve to exclude entry, whether such 
exclusion is efficient. 
Under constant marginal costs, loyalty contracts are an unprofitable method of 
deterring entry.  Moreover, the customers who are most deterred from dealing with 
the entrant are those the conference least wants to deter, i.e., those owed the largest 
rebate.97  Nevertheless, they can exclude an entrant constrained in its ability to offer a 
service of sufficiently high frequency to satisfy shipper demand.98  Loyalty contracts 
reduce uncertainty for conference members by ensuring them a less variable flow of 
cargo, which is particularly valuable given the cost structure that makes full ships 
particularly attractive.99  Because reduced uncertainty lowers costs and prices, these 
arguments are consistent with evidence that shippers were favourable to dual rate 
contracts.100  The pre-WWI West Africa Conference used a deferred rebate system, 
which small shippers favoured but large shippers, who had better options to charter an 
entire ship, opposed.101 
3.3 Price Discrimination 
Conference freight tariffs for a long time were detailed and lengthy, with 
different freight rates for each commodity shipped.  An important issue of contention 
is the extent to which those differing rates are the consequence of cost differences or 
price discrimination.  Differences in cost could arise from, inter alia, differences in 
density (called the stowage factor), difficulties in handling the cargo, insurance, and 
the need for refrigeration.  Differences in transport demand elasticities could arise 
from differences in the costs of waiting: more valuable and more readily perishable 
goods would bear a higher freight rate for quick service.  Even after the widespread 
use of containers, which have made cargoes more homogeneous, these tariffs have 
remained in effect. 
Allegations that conferences price discriminate by charging higher freight rates to 
higher valued commodities are of long standing.  One claim is that they are simply 
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attempts to extract additional profits from a monopoly position.102  The alternative 
view is that conferences price discriminate because the large element of fixed 
common costs requires price discrimination to cover costs.103 
On the monopoly interpretation, price discrimination is destabilizing for the 
conference.  Price discrimination makes entry more attractive because entrants are 
encouraged to focus on the high priced end of the market.  The conference sacrifices 
stability and durability in exchange for higher profits now. 
On the common cost interpretation, price discrimination increases the stability 
and durability of the conference because it allows the conference to expand output 
and therefore is in the joint interests of the conference and shippers as a form of 
Ramsey pricing.104 
An important difficulty is that Ramsey pricing is necessary only if marginal cost 
prices do not cover costs, which means that firms are operating under falling average 
costs.  This seems inconsistent with several firms in a conference.  Having several 
firms all operating in the region of falling average costs may be consistent with 
efficiency, although not with perfect competition.  With U-shaped average cost 
curves, it is usually efficient to bring in an additional producer at a level of demand 
lower than that level necessary to bring the additional producer into the market under 
competition.105  U-shaped average cost curves capture the technology problem, 
because they imply a range of output over which marginal cost is less than average 
cost, so that marginal cost prices do not cover total costs. 
Figure 3106 is the easiest way to see this result. Demand is BB’. MC1 is industry 
marginal cost with one producer, and MC2 is industry marginal cost with two 
identical producers (which assumes a cost minimising division of output between the 
two producers). Average cost is U-shaped and reaches a minimum at average cost 
AA’ and output L. With one producer, efficient output is K. At that output, total value 
(the area under the demand curve) is OBCK. The cost of output L is OADL, and the 
cost of the extra output K-L is LDCK. Therefore, total surplus is ABCD. 
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Figure 3 
With two producers, efficient output is J, where demand intersects MC2. Perfect 
competition cannot sustain that outcome because with two producers, price would be 
below A, and price would not cover average cost. To see whether it is efficient to 
have two producers rather than just one, first calculate total cost if output is J. With 
output H (equal to 2L, because average cost is minimized for one producer at L and 
for two producers at 2L = H), cost is OAGH (average cost times output). If output is 
reduced from H to J, costs fall by JFGH (the area under the marginal curve between J 
and H). Therefore, the cost of output J is OAGFJ. Total value is OBFJ (the area under 
the demand curve), so net surplus is ABE – EFG. The net gain in surplus from 
switching from one to two producers is therefore CDE – EFG. It is efficient to add a 
second producer if CDE > EFG.  To sustain a second producer under perfect 
competition, demand must intersect MC2 at point G, and the area EFG equals zero.  It 
follows that it is efficient to bring in an additional producer at a lower level of 
demand than would be supported by perfect competition. 
A number of attempts have been made to find out whether conferences practice 
price discrimination.  A number of attempts have been made to measure price 
discrimination by regressing the freight rate for different commodities against the 
price of the commodity and a group of variables intended to capture differences in 
transport costs.  The fundamental difficulty is identifying variables that capture 
differences in demand elasticities without also identifying differences in costs.  A 
statistically significant regression coefficient on commodity price is usually asserted 
to be evidence of price discrimination.  Unfortunately, higher priced goods usually 
carry higher insurance costs and frequently require more delicate handling.  To 
identify price discrimination, we would have to know the (unknown) coefficient 
implied by these higher costs and look for evidence of a higher coefficient.  The cost 
variables, moreover, might include price discrimination elements.  For example, 
refrigerated goods usually carry a higher freight rate.  The higher rate may the result 
of the extra costs of refrigeration, or the result of the less elastic demand implied by 
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the perishability of the goods.  To complicate matters, it could easily include both 
elements, so the model cannot identify the separate effects.  A long series of papers107 
have failed to answer this question because they failed to tackle the identification 
problem.  Two papers have made attempts to solve this identification problem. 
Clyde and Reitzes108 have made an innovative attempt to separate the effects of 
market power from cost differences by using panel data (different commodities on 
fourteen routes over four years) in a fixed effects model.  By using dummy variables 
for each commodity, they try to control for cost differences.  The relevant part of their 
regression is rij = 1sj + 2sjpij, where rij is the freight rate for commodity i on route j, 
sj is the conference market share on route j, and pij is the price of commodity i on 
route j.  It follows that rij/sj = 1+ 2pij.  If conferences are price discriminating, 
then a drop in competition from independent carriers (an increase in sj) will not only 
raise freight rates (1 > 0), but will raise them more for higher valued commodities 
(2 > 0).  Clyde and Reitzes find no evidence for discriminatory pricing. 
A recent paper by Hummels, Lugovskyy, and Skiba109 tries to solve the problem 
by looking at changes in import duties.  As product price rises, a given increase in the 
freight rate produces a smaller proportional change in product price, so a higher 
product price implies a less elastic transport demand.  Changes in import duties 
change the elasticity of transport demand without changing transport costs, so they 
become a way to identify price discrimination.  They find substantial price 
discrimination, with a 1% increase in an import duty raising freight rates 1 – 2%, and 
consequent substantial effects on developing country trade. 
3.4 Price and Output Fixing 
Conferences not only fix prices, they set both minimum and maximum outputs. It 
is much easier to make sense of the role of maximum output rules. In a cartel model, 
maximum output rules prevent price from falling to competitive levels. In an empty 
core model, a maximum output rule allows for efficient use of capacity110 
Why though a minimum output rule? One explanation consistent with both cartel 
and empty core models is entry deterrence. Entry deterrence is important in both 
cartel and monopoly models. In cartel models, entry lowers price; in empty core 
models, entry destroys equilibrium. Fusillo111 and Wu112 offer evidence that 
conference liners create excess capacity for strategic entry deterrence. In an open 
conference system, if conferences are successful in imposing entry barriers to non-
conference lines, the entrant may attempt to by-pass those barriers by joining the 
conference. If the minimum output is set high enough, the entrant may end up 
expanding capacity on the route to unprofitable levels. This limit-pricing strategy 
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requires the conference to commit to the minimum output rules by guaranteeing its 
sailing schedules. As with any irreversible commitment, however, this would expose 
the conference to the risks of a mistake. An entrant might overestimate demand and 
therefore mistakenly enter, leaving the conference with excess capacity.113 
Minimum output rules are also consistent with the efficiency argument, raised in 
Figure 1 in the previous section, that with large fixed costs, it may be efficient to 
operate where marginal cost is below average cost. 
Alternatively, consistent with a cartel model, the minimum output rule may be a 
way of excluding small, high cost sellers from the conference. The willingness to 
adhere to a minimum output may be a way of signaling low costs. Every agreement 
has to ensure it is not eroded by attracting high cost entrants. 
Albert Ballin, the managing director of the Hamburg-America Line (Hapag) 
wrote in 1914: 
Especially a very strong and powerful party must continuously 
bear in mind the question, whether the advantages of relying on 
the free interplay of market forces would not be far greater than 
the benefits from inhibiting influence of a conference, which 
after all flow more to its weaker than its stronger members. 
Hapag was at the time the world’s largest shipping line. Although Ballin was 
implying that Hapag was among the stronger, there is some evidence that it was by no 
means the most profitable, which is counter-evidence to the idea that minimum output 
quotas were about excluding high cost entrants.114 
Revenue pooling can be a method of sustaining price discrimination and 
preventing internal cheating in a cartel. It can also be a means of ensuring low cost 
production by separating the decision about efficient output allocation from individual 
firm profitability.115 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Although our understanding of cooperation in liner shipping has improved in 
recent years, there is still much that remains a mystery.  In particular, research on 
strategic alliances remains largely descriptive has not expanded to the careful testing 
applied to other industries.  Maritime economists have much to keep them busy. 
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